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Abstract 
Purpose: the aim of this study is to research applied models of air traffic controllers’ errors prevention in terminal 
control areas (TMA) under uncertainty conditions. In this work the theoretical framework descripting safety events 
and errors of air traffic controllers connected with the operations in TMA is proposed. Methods: optimisation of 
terminal control area formal description based on the Threat and Error management model and the TMA network 
model of air traffic flows. Results: the human factors variables associated with safety events in work of air traffic 
controllers under uncertainty conditions were obtained. The Threat and Error management model application 
principles to air traffic controller operations and the TMA network model of air traffic flows were proposed. 
Discussion: Information processing context for preventing air traffic controller errors, examples of threats in work 
of air traffic controllers, which are relevant for TMA operations under uncertainty conditions. 
Keywords: air traffic controller; air traffic services; error management; proficiency skills; safety of flights; 
terminal control area; uncertainty factors. 
 
1. Introduction 
Air traffic control (ATC) service in terminal control 
areas (TMA) is a highly complex human activity 
that requires controllers to utilise specific 
skills/abilities in response to a number of varying 
unfavourable operational situations/conditions in 
order to ensure the safe flight of aircraft. Controlled 
TMA airspaces in most of industrial countries are 
becoming increasingly crowded with the growth in 
the number of incidents/accidents caused by the 
wrong actions/inactions of involved human 
operators (pilots, air traffic controllers, flight data 
operators, etc.). 
It has been estimated that 60-90 percent of major 
incidents in complex systems such as aviation are 
caused by human errors/violations [1]. Human errors 
are generically defined as “all those occasions in 
which a planned sequence of mental or physical 
activities fail to achieve its intended outcome, and 
when these failures cannot be attributed to the 
intervention of some chance agency” [2]. 
The research is focused exclusively on air traffic 
controller errors and investigates primary impacting 
variables such as information processing, situation 
awareness, memory, attention, etc. Identifying the 
underlying causes of commonly occurring 
incidents/accidents will help future studies in 
designing preventive measures that may help 
eliminate these errors. 
A number of factors are explored, with the aim to 
establish links between the core variables and the 
safety occurrences in terminal control areas as well 
as to establish links between the core variables and 
the uncertainty factors in operation of air traffic 
controllers [3-5]. 
2. Analysis of the latest research and publications 
Rapid advancements in technology have resulted in 
complex work systems in which operators must 
adapt their performance to suit dynamic 
environments, concurrent task demands, time 
pressure and tactical constraints. In research [1] the 
‘mental workload’, which describes the capacity of 
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the operator to meet task demands and physical co-
ordination (task demands) is considered. 
A number of vulnerabilities inherent in human 
information processing have been found in ATC [1]. 
Information processing assumes that human beings 
receive information from the environment, act 
cognitively on that information in a number of ways 
and emit some response back to the environment, as 
it discussed in [6]. 
Mental models are the “mechanisms whereby 
humans are able to generate descriptions of system 
purpose and form, explanations of system 
functioning and observed system states and 
predictions about future system states”. The mental 
picture represents the mental picture of the traffic 
situation and the necessary actions a controller has 
taken and should take. Mental imagery plays a 
significant role in air traffic control and has been 
equated to concepts of situational awareness and 
mental models, represented in [7]. 
Memory is a critical factor in establishing 
effective mental pictures and situation awareness in 
controllers [8]. Memory is a cognitive function that 
is fundamental to most of a controller’s tasks and is 
a common thread in most variables. Shorrock [8] 
found that 38% of memory errors in ATC involved a 
failure to complete an intended action and states that 
controllers rely primarily on working memory and 
long-term memory. Working memory is a 
“temporary store for recently activated items of 
information that are currently occupying 
consciousness and can be manipulated and moved in 
and out of short-term memory” [9]. 
Decision making can be defined as a task in 
which (a) an individual must select one choice from 
a number of choices, (b) there is information 
available with respect to the decisions, (c) the time 
frame is longer than a second and (d) the choice is 
associated with uncertainty, proposed in [10]. 
Attention is broadly defined as “sustained 
concentration on a specific stimulus, sensation, idea, 
thought or activity enabling one to use information 
processing systems with limited capacity to handle 
vast amounts of information available from the sense 
organs and memory stores” [11]. Attention can be 
subdivided into four primary groups; selective, 
focused, sustained and divided. Sustained attention 
refers to the ability to sustain attention over long 
periods of time [12]. 
Situation awareness (SA) is an understanding of 
the state of the environment (including relevant 
parameters of the system). SA constitutes the 
primary basis for subsequent decision making and 
by extension, performance in the operation of 
complex, dynamic systems [13]. Situation awareness 
was stated as the primary cognitive task reported by 
controllers and included maintaining understanding 
current and projected positions of aircraft in the 
controller’s sector in order to determine events that 
require or may require controller activity [14]. 
Air Traffic Management (ATM) is a complex 
system that requires computer systems designed 
purely for the tasks of aircraft management. This 
study investigated the sociotechnical systems 
specific to ATM, noting any delays or errors in 
systems as well as errors in the use of the system, 
capturing the reciprocal nature of human-machine 
interface (HMI). The various models (such as the 
decision making and SA models) stress the 
importance of perception and analysis of the 
environment. The conceptual environmental 
approach builds on this by recognising the crucial 
role that environment scanning and perception have 
on the reciprocal nature of the HMI [15]. 
3. Safety events and errors of air traffic 
controllers connected with the operations in 
TMA 
There are two principal safety events that can 
occur through erroneous Air Traffic Controlling, 
namely, which are connected with activities in 
TMA: 
– loss of separation (LoS); 
– runway incursions (RI). 
A runway incursion is defined as “any 
occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect 
presences of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the 
protected area of a surface designated for the aircraft 
landing and take-off”. Aerodrome controllers are 
required to maintain a constant visual watch over the 
area the aerodrome is responsible for in order to 
ensure that it remains free of obstructions, vehicles 
and other obstructions when needed for aircraft 
movements. 
A loss of separations (LoS) involves an 
infringement of both horizontal and vertical 
separation minima in controlled airspace. There are 
a number of procedures that are considered 
compulsory for controllers. These procedures 
include the practice of read-back, issuing traffic 
information and using radio telephony (R/T) 
phraseology. 
Read-back is defined as a procedure whereby the 
receiving station repeats a received message or an 
appropriate part thereof back to the transmitting 
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station so as to obtain confirmation of correct 
reception. 
Traffic information is issued in a strict format 
that must be followed and forwarded to aircraft in 
the airspace and R/T phraseology sets out the 
phrasing of communications to be used when 
controlling. 
There are three distinct types of errors (Fig. 1): 
slips, lapses and mistakes. Slips and lapses are 
“errors which result from some failure in the 
execution and or storage of an action sequence, 
regardless of whether or not the plan which guided 
them was adequate to achieve its objective”. 
Mistakes are “failures in judgemental and/or 
inferential processes involved in the selection of an 
objective or in the specification of the means to 
achieve it, irrespective of whether or not the actions 
directed by this decision scheme run according to 
plan”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Information Processing Context for preventing air traffic controller errors 
 
Following the working definitions, human 
operating errors can occur in two ways; through an 
action that goes according to plan when the plan was 
inadequate or when the action is deficient despite a 
satisfactory plan [6]. In summary, Reason [6] argues 
for three primary classification types of errors; skill-
based slips, rule-based mistakes and knowledge-
based mistakes. Execution failures correspond to 
skill based levels of performance and planning 
failures with rule and knowledge-based levels [6]. 
Planning failures are classified as mistakes and 
execution failures as slips or lapses. 
The human factors variables, which are 
associated with safety events in work of air traffic 
controllers under uncertainty conditions, are divided 
in such clusters as follows: 
1. Information Processing: 
– Monitoring failure; 
– Information Overload; 
– Ambiguous instructions issued; 
– Similar call signs; 
– Misjudged Aircraft projection. 
2. Situation Awareness: 
– Erroneous hear-back; 
– Misjudged aircraft projection; 
– Erroneous Perception; 
– Failure to recognize risk; 
– Instruction issued to wrong aircraft. 
3. Memory: 
– Forgot planned action; 
– Inaccurate recall of temporary memory; 
– Working memory failure; 
– Rarely used information. 
4. Attention: 
– Divided; 
– Selective; 
– Focused. 
5. Human Machine Interface: 
– System delay; 
– Poor label management; 
– Insufficient use of tools. 
6. Workload: 
– High/Low complexity; 
– High/Low volume; 
– Underload/Overload; 
– Subjective traffic complexity rating; 
– Subjective workload rating. 
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It was found that time since start of shift is a 
significant predictor of safety events. Furthermore, 
time frames 0-30 minutes and 91 – 151 minutes 
were the most frequently occurring time of the 
safety events. In terms of safety events, it was found 
that information processing (human factors), 
workplace design (external factors), poor adherence 
to communication standards and lack of memory 
cues (risk factors) are significant predictors of safety 
events. 
With respect to human error, lapses were found 
to predict two components of information 
processing; detection and auditory errors. Poor 
workplace design was found to be a significant 
predictor of lapses. 
4. The Threat and Error management model 
application to air traffic controller operations 
The Threat and Error Management (TEM) model is 
a conceptual framework that assists in 
understanding, from an operational perspective, the 
inter-relationship between safety and human 
performance in dynamic and challenging operational 
contexts. 
The TEM model focuses simultaneously on the 
operational context and the people discharging 
operational duties in such context. The model is 
descriptive and diagnostic of both human and system 
performance. 
It is descriptive because it captures human and 
system performance in the normal operational 
context, resulting in realistic descriptions. It is 
diagnostic because it allows quantifying 
complexities of the operational context in relation to 
the description of human performance in that 
context, and vice-versa. 
There are three basic components in the TEM 
model, from the perspective of flight crews: threats, 
errors and undesired aircraft states. The model 
proposes that threats and errors are part of everyday 
aviation operations that must be managed by flight 
crews, since both threats and errors carry the 
potential to generate undesired aircraft states. 
Flight crews must also manage undesired aircraft 
states, since they carry the potential for unsafe 
outcomes. Undesired state management is an 
essential component of the TEM model, as 
important as threat and error management. 
Undesired aircraft state management largely 
represents the last opportunity to avoid an unsafe 
outcome and thus maintain safety margins in flight 
operations. 
Table 1 presents examples of threats, grouped 
under two basic categories derived from the TEM 
model. Environmental threats occur due to the 
environment in which flight operations take place. 
Some environmental threats can be planned for and 
some will arise spontaneously, but they all have to 
be managed by flight crews in real time. 
Organizational threats, on the other hand, can be 
controlled or, at least, minimised, at source by 
aviation organizations. 
 
Table 1 
Examples of threats 
Environmental Threats Organizational Threats 
Weather: thunderstorms, turbulence, icing, wind 
shear, cross/tailwind, very low/high temperatures. 
ATC: traffic congestion, TCAS RA/TA, ATC 
command, ATC error, ATC language difficulty, 
ATC non-standard phraseology, ATC runway 
change, ATIS communication, units of 
measurement (QFE/meters). 
Airport: contaminated/short runway; 
contaminated taxiway, lack of/confusing/faded 
signage/markings, birds, aids U/S, complex 
surface navigation procedures, airport 
constructions. 
Terrain: High ground, slope, lack of references, 
“black hole”. 
Other: similar call-signs. 
Operational pressure: delays, late arrivals, 
equipment changes. 
Aircraft: aircraft malfunction, automation 
event/anomaly, MEL/CDL. 
Cabin: flight attendant error, cabin event distraction, 
interruption, cabin door security. 
Maintenance: maintenance event/error. 
Ground: ground handling event, de-icing, ground 
crew error. 
Dispatch: dispatch paperwork event/error. 
Documentation: manual error, chart error. 
Other: crew scheduling event 
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5. The TMA network model of air traffic flows 
We divide the airspace into line elements on which 
we model the density of aircraft. These line elements 
are called paths and in practice often coincide with 
jetways. We represent a link on a path as a segment 
[ ]L,0  and we denote by ( )txu ,  the number of 
aircraft between distances 0 and x  at time t . In 
particular, ( ) 0,0 =tu  and ( )tLu ,  is the total 
number of aircraft in the path modelled by [ ]L,0  at 
time t . We make the additional assumption of a 
steady velocity profile ( ) 0>xv  which depicts the 
mean velocity of aircraft flow at position x  and 
time t . Applying the conservation of mass to a 
control volume comprised between positions x  and 
hx + , and letting h  tend to 0, one easily finds the 
following relation between the spatial and temporal 
derivatives of ( )txu ,  [16]: 
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where ( )tq  represents the inflow at the entrance 
of the link ( )0=x  or in terms of the density 
( ) ( )0, (0)q t t v= ρ . 
We can define the density of aircraft as the weak 
derivative of ( )txu ,  with respect to x : 
( ) ( ),, u x tx t
x
∂ρ =
∂
. 
The aircraft density is a solution of the partial 
differential equation: 
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This is a linear advection equation with positive 
velocity ( )xv  and a source term: ( ) ( )txxv ,' ρ . 
Clearly, these two partial differential equations are 
equivalent and model the same physical 
phenomenon. 
We now consider a junction with m  incoming 
links numbered from 1 to m  and n  outgoing links 
numbered from 1+m  to nm + ; each link k  is 
represented by an interval [ ]kL,0 . One can see that 
any network is composed of a number of such 
junctions. We define an allocation matrix 
( )( )tmM ij=  for nmjmmi +≤≤+≤≤ 1,1  
where 1)(0 ≤≤ tmij  denotes the proportion of 
aircrafts from incoming link i  going to the outgoing 
link j ; we should also have ( )∑ + += =nm mj ij tm1 1 for 
mi ≤≤1 . The system of partial differential 
equations on the network can be written as [16]: 
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We will now show that on such a network, the 
preceding system of partial differential equations 
admits a unique solution hence that the problem is 
well-posed. 
6. Conclusions 
In this research we considered the human factors 
variables, which are associated with safety events in 
work of air traffic controllers under uncertainty 
conditions. The threat and error management model 
was analysed and proposed its application in air 
traffic controller operations. Also we provided 
examples of threats in work of air traffic controllers, 
which are relevant for TMA operations under 
uncertainty conditions. 
Utilisation of the TMA network model of air 
traffic flow in link with above mentioned models 
will decrease number incidents/accidents caused by 
air traffic controllers (and associated personnel) and 
improve safety of flights. 
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В.П. Харченко1, Ю.В. Чинченко2 
Моделі попередження помилок авіадиспетчерів в термінальних диспетчерських районах у 
умовах невизначеності 
Національний авіаційний університет, просп. Космонавта Комарова, 1, Київ, Україна, 03680 
Е-mails: 1kharch@nau.edu.ua; 2chynchenko@gmail.com 
 
Мета: метою цієї статті є дослідження прикладних моделей попередження помилок авіадиспетчерів у 
термінальних диспетчерських районах в умовах невизначеності. У роботі запропоновано теоретичні 
основи формального опису подій з безпеки польотів та помилок авіадиспетчерів, пов’язаних із 
виконанням технологічних операцій в ТМА. Методи дослідження: оптимізація формального опису 
термінального диспетчерського району, що ґрунтується на моделі управління загрозами та 
помилками та мережевій моделі потоків повітряного руху в ТМА. Результати: отримано показники, 
пов’язані з подіями з безпеки польотів у роботі авіадиспетчерів в умовах невизначеності. 
Запропоновано принципи застосування моделі управління загрозами та помилками та мережевої 
моделі потоків повітряного руху в ТМА. Обговорення: середовище обробки інформації для 
попередження помилок авіадиспетчерів, приклади загроз в роботі авіадиспетчерів, які характерні для 
виконання технологічних операцій в ТМА в умовах невизначеності. 
 
Ключові слова: авіадиспетчер; безпека польотів; обслуговування повітряного руху; професійно-
важливі якості; термінальний диспетчерський район; управління помилками; фактори 
невизначеності. 
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В.П. Харченко1, Ю.В. Чинченко2 
Модели предотвращения ошибок авиадиспетчеров в терминальных диспетчерских районах в 
условиях неопределенности 
Национальный авиационный университет, просп. Космонавта Комарова, 1, Киев, Украина, 03680 
Е-mails: 1kharch@nau.edu.ua; 2chynchenko@gmail.com 
 
Цель: целью данной статьи является исследование прикладных моделей предупреждения ошибок 
авиадиспетчеров в терминальных диспетчерских районах в условиях неопределенности. В данной 
работе предложены теоретические основы формального описания событий по безопасности полетов 
и ошибок авиадиспетчеров, связанных с выполнением технологических операций в ТМА. Методы 
исследования: оптимизация формального описания терминального диспетчерского района, 
основанная на модели управления угрозами и ошибками и сетевой модели потоков воздушного 
движения в ТМА. Результаты: получены показатели, связанные с событиями по безопасности 
полетов в работе авиадиспетчеров в условиях неопределенности. Предложены принципы применения 
модели управления угрозами и ошибками и сетевой модели потоков воздушного движения в ТМА. 
Обсуждение: среда обработки информации для предупреждения ошибок авиадиспетчеров, примеры 
угроз в работе авиадиспетчеров, характерные для выполнения технологических операций в ТМА в 
условиях неопределенности. 
 
Ключевые слова: авиадиспетчер; безопасность полетов; обслуживание воздушного движения; 
управление ошибками; профессионально-важные качества; терминальный диспетчерский район; 
факторы неопределенности. 
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